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The Simple Case of In Vitro Fertilization 
and Embryo Transfer 
William E. May 
The alilhor . ./iJrmer hook rel'ie\\' ediror for Linacre Quarterly, is a 
proj"essor oj" moral theologr in the School oj" Religious Studies at the 
Catholic Unil 'ersitr oj"America. 
M any people, both Catholic and non-Catholic, can readily understand 
why the Catho li c Church teaches that it is morally bad to generate human 
life by inseminating a married woman with sperm provided by a man who 
is not her husband or by having sperm provided by her husband 
inseminate another woman, a so-ca lled "surrogate" mother, who would, 
after bearing the child, turn it over to the married couple. They recognize 
that choosing to generate human life in this way does violence to marriage 
and to human parenthood and does an injustice to the child. Such people 
can likewise understand why the Catholic Church rejects the deliberate 
creat ion in the laboratory of human lives which will be discarded or frozen 
or used for experiments designed only to gain knowledge which may 
benefit others, but which only poses harm to the lives upon which the 
experiments are performed. They recognize that such procedures do 
violence to the dignity of the human lives deliberately brought into 
existence in the laboratory. And such people also understand why the 
Catholic Church opposes the monitoring of human lives in utero for the 
purpose of detecting and then destroying, through abortion, those 
discovered to be of poor quality. Again they recognize that choosing to act 
in this way does a terrible violence and injustice to unborn human lives. 
But many of these same people, Catholic as well as non-Catholic, find 
the teaching of the Catholic Church (as recently expressed in the Sacred 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith's "Instruction on Respect for 
Human Life in Its Origin and on the Dignity of Human Procreation"), on 
the immorality of the "simple case" of in I'itro fertilizat ion, a different 
matter. I n this case, there is no use of gametic materials from third parties; 
the child conceived is genetically the child of husband and wife, who are 
and will remain its parents. In this case, there is no deliberate creation of 
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"excess" human lives which will be discarded , frozen, or made the subjects 
of medical research of no benefit to them. In this case, there need be no 
intention of intrauterine monitoring with a view to abortion. Nor need 
there be, in this case, the use of immoral means (masturbation) to obtain 
the father's sperm, for the sperm can be retrieved in morally acceptable 
ways. In this case there is, apparently, only the intent to help the couple, 
unable (by reason of the wife's blocked Fallopian tubes) to have a child 
with whom they ardently desire to share life and to whom they wish to give 
a decent home, realize their legitimate desires. Why, many people 
reasonably ask , is it morally wicked - indeed, sinful, an offense against 
God - to remove an ovum from the wife's body, fertilize it outside her 
body with sperm from her own husband, and then transfer the developing 
human life to her womb, where it will implant, develop, be nourished, and 
from which it will in due time emerge in birth? What wrong is being done? 
What evil is being willed? Is not the position of the Catholic Church on this 
matter too rigid? Is not the Church being insensitive to the agonizing plight 
of involuntarily infertile couples who are seeking, by making good use of 
modern biological technologies, to realize one of the goods of marriage? 
The purpose of this paper is to examine, first, the reasons given by the 
Vatican I nstruction to support this teaching of the Church and , second, to 
comment on these reasons in an effort to show that they are very good 
reasons, rooted in truths about human persons, which truths are of critical 
importance to a proper understanding of human existence. 
The Reasoning Given in the Vatican Instruction 
If one examines the Vatican document, one finds two major lines of 
reasoning advanced to support the conclusion that it is morally wrong for 
a married couple to generate new life through in vitro fertilization and 
embryo transfer, even when the ovum fertilized comes from the mother's 
body and the sperm used to fertilize it are retrieved in a morally acceptable 
way from her husband's body. 
The first argument is based on the inseparability of the life-giving 
(procreative) and love-giving (unitive) meanings of the conjugal act. The 
Instruction, citing Pope Paul VI 's "Humanae Vitae", first affirms "the 
'inseparable connection, willed by God and unable to be broken by man on 
his own initiative, between the two meanings of the conjugal act: the 
unitive meaning and the procreative meaning. Indeed, by its intimate 
structure, the conjugal act, while most closely uniting husband and wife, 
makes them capable of the generation of new lives, according to laws 
inscribed in the very being of man and woman' "I It then applies this 
teaching to the problem of "homologous artificial fertilization", or the 
"simple case" with which we are concerned, by affirming, with Pope Pius, 
XII, that "it is never permitted to separate these different aspects to such a 
degree as positively to exclude either the procreative intention [as is done 
in contraceptive intercourse] or the conjugal relation' " 2 The instruction 
then draws the following conclusion: 
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Thus,/ertilizalion is lid llr soughl u'hen il is Ihe resull a/a 'con;ugal aC/ lI 'hich is 
per se suilable/or Ihe general ion a/children 10 lI 'hich marriage is ordered hr ils 
nalUre and by lI 'hich Ihe spouses hecom e oneflesh,' BU/ji'oll1lhe 1I10rai poil1l or 
vie,,' procreOlion is deprived o/ilS proper per/'e('/ion lI 'hen il is nol desired as Ihe 
ji'uil o/Ihe con;ugal 0('/. Ihal is 10 .1'0.1'. o/Ihe spedfic al'l o/Ihe spouses' union"' 
(emphasis in original), 
The second argument presented in the I nstruction to support its 
conclusion on the immorality of the simple cases of in vitro fertilization 
and embryo transfer is based on the dignity of the child who is conceived , 
The Vatican document holds that the child "cannot be desired or 
conceived as the product of an intervention of medical or biological 
techniques," Why? Because "that would be equivalent to reducing him to 
an object of scientific technology, No one may subject the coming of a 
child into the world to conditions of technical efficacy which are to be 
evaluated according to standards of control and dominion"4 The 
Instruction then concludes: 
Conception in vilro is the result of the technical action which presides over 
fertilization, Such/erlili::alion i,l' neil her in/al'l achie"ed nor posili"ell' lI'illed 0,1' 
I he expression andji'uil 0/ a specific 0('/ or I he con;ugal union, In hOll1ologous 
I VF and ET. Ihere/ore. even i/'il is considered inlhe C'Ol1IeXI o/de facto exisling 
sexual relOlions. Ihe generOlion orlhe human penon is oh;eclh'eil' deprh 'ed O/il,I' 
proper per/eclion. nomell'. Ihal 0/ heing Ihe resull ondji'llil 0/ a ('(}n;ugal 0('/ 
in which the spouses can become 'cooperators with God for giving life to a new 
person'5 (emphasis in original), 
This second argument can, it seems to me, be summed up as follows: to 
desire or cause a child as a product of a technique is to make the child an 
object. But this is incompatible with the equality in personal dignity 
between the child and those who give it life. 
The central claims serving as the premises of the arguments advanced by 
the I nstruction to show that it is always wrong to generate human life in the 
laboratory are, then, the following: I) there is an inseparable connection, 
willed by God and unable to be broken by man on his own initiative, 
between the life-giving and love-giving meanings of the conjugal act, and 
2) to conceive or desire a child as the product of a technique and not as the 
fruit of the conjugal act is to treat the child as ifit were an object. Neither of 
these propositions is self-evidently true. This does not, of course, mean 
that they are false . Still, their truth needs to be shown, for it is upon their 
truth that the conclusion, namely, that it is morally wicked to generate 
human life in the laboratory, is grounded. My intention now is to offer 
some reasons to support the truth of these propositions. 
Marital Rights and Capabilities, the Marital Act, and the 
Generation of Human Life 
believe that the truth of the claim concerning the inseparable 
connection between the life-giving and love-giving meanings of the 
conjugal act can be established by rights and capabilities of married 
persons and their relationship to the conjugal or marital act. 
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By getting married, husbands and wives have not only acquired rights 
that non married men and women do not have, but they have also given to 
themselves capacities that non married men and women do not have. 
Nonmarried men and women have the natural capacity, by virtue of 
their sexual natures and their endowment with sexual organs , to engage in 
genital sex. They similarly have the capacity to generate human life 
through their genital acts. Yet they do not have the right to intimate genital 
acts, nor do they have the right to generate human life. This is not the place 
to develop fully the reasons why nonmarried men and women do not have 
the right to engage in intimate genital acts. " Put briefly, the reason is 
simply that they have not , by their own free choice, capacitated themselves 
to respect each other as irreplaceable and nonsubstitutable persons in their 
freely chosen genital acts. Such acts between nonmarried males and 
females do not unite two irreplaceable and nonsubstitutable persons, but 
rather join two individuals who are, in principle, replaceable, 
substitutable, disposable. But human persons ought not to be treated in 
this way. Similarly, nonmarried men and women do not have a right to 
generate human life, precisely because they have not capacitated 
themselves to receive such life lovingly , nourish it humanely, and educate it 
in the love and service of God. 7 Practically all societies, it should be noted , 
rightly regard as irresponsible the generation of children through the 
random copulation of unattached males and females. 
Husbands and wives, on the contrary, have the right to an intimate 
sharing of life and love and to the marital act (whose nature will be more 
fully described later). They have this right precisely because they have 
capacitated themselves, through their irrevocable gift of themselves to one 
another in marriage,8 to respect one another as irreplaceable and 
nonsubstitutable spouses. They have similarly capacitated themselves to 
receive human life lovingly , nourish it humanely, and educate it in the love 
and service of God , for by marrying they have made themselves capable of 
accepting any human life that should be given to them and of giving it the 
home to which it has a right and in which it can take root and grow. They 
have, in short, capacitated themselves to give to one another a unique and 
singular kind of human love, marital love, a love that is fully human, total , 
faithful and exclusive until death, and fruitful.9 By so capacitating 
themselves by their free choice to marry, they have acquired the right to 
live as husband and wife , to share their lives fully, and to receive human life 
in a manner corresponding to its dignity. 
Perhaps an analogy may be helpful here. I do not have the right to 
diagnose sick people and prescribe medicines for them, for I have not 
chosen to study medicine and acquire the knowledge and skills needed to 
do these tasks. But doctors, who have freely chosen to submit themselves 
to the discipline of studying medicine and acquiring medical skills, do have 
this right. Similarly, unmarried males and females do not have the right to 
engage in intimate genital union and to receive human life because they 
have failed to make the choices necessary to enable them to engage in these 
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activities . But husbands and wives have, by their own free and responsible 
choice, capacitated themselves to do so. Their right to engage in the 
marital act splendidly illumines this truth. To show why, I shall now make 
some observations about the marital act. 
Clarification of Marital Act 
The marital or conjugal act is not simply a genital act between a man and 
a woman who happen to be married. Husbands and wives have the 
capacity to engage in genital acts, as do nonmarried males and females, 
because of their sexual nature and their endowment with genitalia. But 
they have the capacity (and the right) to engage in the marital act because 
they are spouses, i.e., husbands and wives . The marital act, therefore, is 
more than a simple genital act between a man and a woman who happen to 
be married . It is an act which participates inwardly in their marital union 
and which respects the "goods" of marriage, i.e., the good of faithful and 
exclusive spousal love and the good of children. Thus the marital act is one 
which is 1) open to the communication of spousal love and 2) open to the 
reception of human life. Thus, a genital act forced upon a wife by a 
drunken husband, seeking only to gratify his sexual desires and 
unconcerned with the legitimate desires of his wife, is a genital act, but is 
hardly to be counted as a marital act. 10 Similarly, a genital act between 
husbands and wives which is deliberately made inimical to the reception of 
human life - that is, an act of contraceptive intercourse - is also one that 
violates the meaning of the marital act, precisely because it dishonors one 
of the goods of marriage. I I 
The marital act, in other words, is by its own inner structure one which is 
love-giving or open to the communication of spousal love, and life-giving 
or open to the reception of human life, of a new human person. And these 
two meanings or aspects of the marital act are inherently interrelated, 
connected. While it is not good for human life to be generated in the 
random copulation of unmarried men and women, it is good, and indeed 
beautiful, that human life can be given in the "one-flesh" marital union of 
husbands and wives . The bond uniting these two meanings of the marital 
act shows that the love husbands and wives have for one another, while 
exclusive in that they have unreservedly and completely given themselves 
exclusively to one another, "foreswearing all others," is not an egoisme d 
deux, a narcissistic and selfish love. It shows that their love for one another 
is actually what capacitates them to welcome new human life and give it 
the home to which it has the right. The bond uniting these two meanings of 
the marital act shows that the marital union is one which is love-giving and 
life-giving, a beautiful human reality fitting to be a "sacrament" of the 
love-giving and life-giving union between Christ and His bride, the 
Church. The bond uniting these two aspects of the marital act actualizes 
the rights and capabilities which husbands and wives have acquired by 
virtue of their choice to marry, to be "one flesh". The "connection" 
between these two meanings of the marital act is inseparable insofar as this 
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act is one that inwardly perfects and expresses their one-flesh marital 
union, the union which capacitates them to give to each other the unique 
and exclusive love rightly called " marital" love and to receive human life 
lovingly, as a gift from the One Who is the source of life, and as a gift to be 
welcomed as a person equal in dignity to themselves. 
While husbands and wives have the right to engage in the marital act 
and, through it, to receive the gift of life, they do not have the right to a 
child. They do not have this right because a child is, like them, a person, a 
being that is sui iuris. A child is not a thing which others can possess or 
own, nor is it an act to which persons can have rights. 
It is for these reasons that the proposition affirming an inseparable 
connection, willed by God and unable to be broken by man on his own 
initiative, between the love-giving and life-giving meanings of the marital 
act is true. Human life is a gift from God which is to be received by those 
who have made themselves capable of receiving it in the act which is proper 
and specific to them. 
'Procreating' Human Life vs. 'Reproducing' Human Life 
As we have just seen, when human life is given through the act of marital 
union, it comes, even when ardently desired , as a "gift" crowning the act 
itself. The marital act is not an act of "making" either babies or love. Love 
is not a prod uct that one makes; it is a gift that one gives - the gift of self. 
Similarly, a baby is not a product inferior to its producers; rather, it is a 
being equal in personal dignity to its parents. The marital act is something 
which husbands and wives "do"; it is not something that they "make." 
What is the difference between "making" and "doing," and what is the 
human significance of this difference? 
In "making", the action proceeds from an agent or agents to something 
produced in the external world. Autoworkers , for instance, produce cars; 
cooks produce meals; bakers produce cakes, etc. Such action is transitive 
insofar as it passes from the acting subject(s) to an object fashioned by him 
or her (them). In this kind of human activity, governed by the rules of art, 
interest centers on the item made (and usually those which do not measure 
up to standard are discarded - or at any rate, they are little appreciated). 
Those who produce the products made may be morally goodautoworkers 
or cooks or bakers or they may be morally bad, but our interest in 
"making" is in the product, not the producers, and we would prefer to have 
good cars from morally wicked autoworkers than "lemons" from morally 
good ones. 
In another mode of human activity - "doing" -the action abides in the 
acting subject(s). The action is immanent and is governed by the 
requirements of prudence, not by the rules of art. If the action is good, it 
perfects the agent(s); if bad, it degrades and dehumanizes them.12 I should 
note here that every act of "making" is also an act of "doing" insofar as it is 
freely chosen, for the choice to make something is something that we "do," 
and the choice, as self-determining, abides in us . Thus, in choosing to make 
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a good cake for someone's birthday, one is choosing to respect the good of 
friendship and is "doing" something good and making oneself to be, in this 
respect, a good person . Likewise, in choosing to write pornography, one is 
choosing to do something that is evil because it dishonors the dignity of 
human persons. But the main point I wish to make here is the difference 
between "making" and "doing." Making is a transitive action proceeding 
from an agent to some product in the external world . Doing is an 
immanent action which abides in the agent. 
When human life is given through the marital act , it comes, as we have 
seen, as a "gift" crowning the act itself. The marital act is not an act of 
making. It is not a transitive act issuing from the spouses and terminating 
in some object distinct from them. Rather, it is an act freely chosen by them 
to express their marital union, one open to the gift of life. As such, it is 
inwardly perfective of them as spouses, ennobling and enriching their 
marital life, the life of which they are co-subjects, such as they are co-
subjects of the marital act itself. Even when they choose this act with the 
ardent hope that, through it, new human life will come to be, the life 
begotten is not the product of their art but is a "gift supervening on and 
giving permanent embodiment to" the marital act itself. 13 Thus, when 
human life comes to be through the marital act, we can rightly say that the 
spouses are " procreating" or "begetting". Moreover, the act they choose is 
and remains an immanent act, not a transitive one; it is an act abiding in 
them and inwardly participating in their marital union. 
But when human life comes to be as a result of in vitro fertilization , it is 
the end product of a series of actions. transitive in nature, undertaken by 
different persons. The spouses "produce" the gametic materials which 
others then manipulate in order to produce the end product - the child. 
As the authors ofa report commissioned by the Catholic bishops of Great 
Britain correctly noted, as a result of the process the "child comes into 
existence, not as a gift supervening on an act expressive of the marital 
union . .. but rather in the manner of a product of a making (and, typically, 
as the end product of a process managed and carried out by persons other 
than his parents)".14 
But a child is not a product inferior to its producers and subject to 
quality controls; rather, as I noted already, it is a person equal in dignity to 
its parents. Thus a child ought not be treated as a product. But a child is so 
treated when it is "made" in the laboratory, and this is precisely what is 
done when the child comes to be as a result of in vitro fertilization. The 
husband and wife are not capable of participating in this procedure 
because they are husband and wife. Rather. they are capable of 
participating in this process of making because they are the producers of 
materials which others use in order to produce the product desired . 
"Making" babies in the laboratory changes the generation of human life 
from being an act of procreative love to being a transitive act of 
"reproduction". But human beings who are, as it were, the created words 
of God, the created words that His uncreated Word made His brothers 
February. 1988 35 
and sisters when He became incarnate, ought, like the uncreated Word of 
God, to be "begotten, not made." 
I believe that these words - "begotten, not made" - taken from the 
Nicene Creed, give us the ultimate reason why it is wrong, morally wicked , 
a sinful offense against God, to "make" babies in the laboratory. For 
human babies are not things or products which others are to make. Rather, 
they are beings created in the image and likeness of the all-holy God. Like 
His eternally begotten Word Who is one in being with Him, they too ought 
to be begotten, not made, and they ought to be begotten in the one-flesh 
union of men and women who have made themselves, by getting married, 
capable of receiving the gift of human life. 
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